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After nearly nine decades of benign neglect, Turkey has set about reestablishing its
influence in the Middle East. Although most observers agree that the United States and
Turkey share a number of overlapping goals in the Middle East, Turkey's recent
rapprochement with Iran has drawn the ire of the United States. In tandem, Turkey's
relations with Israel, Washington's closest ally in the region, have deteriorated rapidly
following Israel's war in Gaza and the events aboard the Mavi Marmara. These coinciding
events have further complicated U.S.-Turkish relations and have led a number of pundits in
Washington to openly question Turkey's ideological orientation. If Ankara and Washington
want to mend relations they should acknowledge that their disagreements are not about
their overall vision or intention for the region, but over how to implement and carry out
foreign policy. Both Ankara and Washington should do a better job of enumerating their
long-term regional policy goals and engage in a broader dialogue to clearly transmit these
ideas to each other, while working together to achieve them.
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Abstract
After nearly nine decades of benign neglect, Turkey has set about reestablishing its influence in the Middle East. Although most observers agree
that the United States and Turkey share a number of overlapping goals in
the Middle East, Turkey's recent rapprochement with Iran has drawn the
ire of the United States. In tandem, Turkey's relations with Israel, Washington's closest ally in the region, have deteriorated rapidly following
Israel's war in Gaza and the events aboard the Mavi Marmara. These
coinciding events have further complicated U.S.-Turkish relations and
have led a number of pundits in Washington to openly question Turkey's
ideological orientation. If Ankara and Washington want to mend relations
they should acknowledge that their disagreements are not about their
overall vision or intention for the region, but over how to implement and
carry out foreign policy. Both Ankara and Washington should do a better
job of enumerating their long-term regional policy goals and engage in a
broader dialogue to clearly transmit these ideas to each other, while working together to achieve them.

Introduction
Traditionally, the United States' policy in the Middle East has been based
on ensuring Israeli security and maintaining access to Gulf oil. Following
the division of the Middle East at the Yalta Conference, the United States
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gradually replaced Great Britain and France as the dominant power in the
Middle East. After the onset of the Cold War, the United States and the
Soviet Union sought to control the region's vast oil reserves. The United
States was principally concerned with the spread of Arab nationalist governments that allied themselves with the Soviet Union. For the United
States, the festering Middle Eastern conflicts were viewed through a Cold
War lens and were thought of as part of the global competition between
the United States and the Soviet Union.
The Cold War backdrop was the impetus for the close relations with Iran
and Turkey. The United States' Middle East strategy emphasized arming
its allies in order to limit the likelihood of committing its troops abroad to
help secure its vital interests. Iran and Turkey were both front-line states
that the United States counted on to help repel any attack by the Soviet
Union and the Warsaw Pact. In both cases, the United States poured in
billions of dollars of advanced military equipment to bolster these two
countries' military capabilities, and, at the same time, help ensure that
they remained in the United States' sphere of influence.
The theoretical underpinning for the United States' strategy was the belief
in containment, using military, economic, and diplomatic strategies to
help prevent the spread of Communism. After the fall of the Soviet Union,
the United States found itself in an unrivaled position of power in the
Middle East. Former President Bill Clinton implemented "dual containment," a U.S. strategy to economically and militarily isolate Iran and Iraq.
The United States' new policy emphasized coercion and military superiority, rather than American "soft power." These sentiments were strengthened under former President George W. Bush and the contemporaneous
ascendance of an American neo-conservative foreign policy that advocated for—and eventually succeeded in—overthrowing Saddam Hussein.
Turkey's geostrategic position made it an indispensable U.S. ally during
the Cold War and its aftermath. The U.S. Air Force base in Adana, Turkey
was used to enforce the Iraqi no-fly zones, allowing the United States to
maintain a strong military presence on Iran's northwestern border. However, in the years following the Cold War, Turkey set about mending its
relations with Iran, as part of a larger effort to quell Kurdish separatism
and diversify its suppliers of natural gas. In addition, the election of the
Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AK Party, or Justice and Development Party)
in 2001 ushered in a new government interested in strengthening Turkey's ties to the Middle East. They brought with them a new foreign policy
concept that emphasized "soft power" and "a zero problems with your
neighbors" foreign policy.
2
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As a result, the United States and Turkey find themselves at odds over
how to implement policy in the Middle East. This ideological disagreement has strained relations between the two allies. However, Turkey's foreign policy is not, as some right-wing pundits claim, a product of its prime
minster's religious sympathies. Instead, it is part of an overall effort to
improve Turkey's position in an economically and militarily important
region. In fact, the United States and Turkey share many of the same
goals for the Middle East. The fundamental difference between the United
States and Turkey is how each intends to implement its current Middle
East policy.
Unless both countries make an effort to better understand each other's
intentions in the Middle East, the alliance will continue to be marred by
misunderstandings and unfair accusations about overall intention. President Obama's renewed emphasis on diplomacy to help resolve the Iran
nuclear issue has certainly helped clarify the United States' position vis-àvis Iran. However, uncertainties over each other's overall intentions
remain, as evidenced by Turkey's recent decision to vote "no" on the latest
round of UN Security council sanctions against Iran. To better understand how Iran influences U.S.-Turkey relations, we need to analyze the
theoretical underpinnings of Turkey's new foreign policy and chart the
history of Turkish-Iranian relations.

Turkey's New Middle East Policy: Re-Engaging with
Its Ottoman Past
Turkey has set about mending relations with its Arab and non-Arab
neighbors, and is seeking to re-establish its ties with the Middle East.
After years of benign neglect, Turkey's current government, the AK Party,
has re-engaged with the former provinces in the Ottoman Empire. Turkey's new policy is based on what its current foreign minister, Ahmet
Davutogolu, calls "strategic depth"—a foreign policy seeking to balance
Turkey's relations with the West and its former Ottoman provinces in the
South and East.1 The policy includes a conscious effort to establish strong
security and economic ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran, along with
other countries in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.
At the outset, the West encouraged Turkey's new assertive foreign policy,
believing that Turkey could serve as a vital diplomatic actor in the Middle
East. The European Union believed that Turkey's unique position in the
region could facilitate diplomacy and help solve some of the intractable
conflicts that have been festering in the Middle East. President Obama
chose Turkey as the first Muslim country to visit after being elected presi3
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dent and called Turkey a "strategic partner."2 Turkey was an active participant in the Middle East peace process and facilitated talks between Israel
and Syria.3 These new diplomatic initiatives reflect the AK Party's belief
that dialogue and diplomacy are the best tools to resolve international
disputes. Turkey has chosen to use its "soft power" to implement its "zero
problems" foreign policy instead of relying on coercion. Despite the diplomatic accolades, Turkey's new outlook has drawn the ire of the United
States and some European countries because of their long-standing commitment to a coercive foreign policy in the Middle East and their determination to isolate Iran.
Turkey's recent rapprochement with Iran has drawn the ire of the United
States because of: Turkey's swift recognition of President Ahmedinejad
after the controversial 2009 election, Prime Minister Erdogan's
unabashed support of Iran's nuclear enrichment program, Turkey's (and
Brazil's) separate fuel-swap agreements with Iran, and its "no" vote on the
recent UN Security Council sanctions against Iran. These developments
coincided with the recent collapse of Turkish-Israeli relations following
Israel's bombing of Gaza and the tragic incident on the Mavi Marmara.
In tandem, Turkish-Iranian economic relations have flourished during a
time when the United States and its Western allies have implemented a
number of unilateral sanctions designed to limit Iran's banks and prevent
Iran's import of refined petroleum. The Turkish Government has said that
it will only comply with the UN Security Council sanctions, and does not
feel that it is legally obligated to comply with the United States' and European Union's unilateral sanctions.4
The current Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has consistently
stated his opposition to an Iranian nuclear weapon, but has fervently iterated his belief that Iran has the right to nuclear enrichment and the pursuit of a peaceful nuclear-energy program.5 By refusing to take a more
proactive stance against Iran's nuclear program, some Western Security
officials argue that Turkey's current government is blunting international
efforts to curtail Iran's enrichment program. Some suggest that Turkey is
"turning east," in reference to the current government's alleged "Islamist
sympathies."6 Erdogan's comments and Turkey's activist foreign policy
have cast a shadow over U.S.-Turkish relations. Perhaps, most importantly, these developments have overshadowed the fact that both countries share many of the same strategic goals in the Middle East. Both seek
to limit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle
East, have a vested interest in supporting Iraq's dysfunctional government, are committed to combating terrorism, and seek a just solution to
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
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The problem is that both countries are at loggerheads over how to go
about implementing their strategic objectives. The United States, in keeping with its policy of "containment," has imposed strict financial sanctions
and continues to arm Tehran's traditional enemies.7 With regards to the
United States' Iran policy, Ankara views sanctions suspiciously, believing
that their implementation may eventually lead to war or limited military
action.8 Instead, Ankara believes that robust diplomacy, combined with
deep economic and cultural ties, will help Ankara shape Iranian behavior.
They believe that an isolated Iran is more likely to lash out to bolster
domestic legitimacy, and the results of any armed conflict will seriously
threaten Turkey's economy. Furthermore, Ankara does not actually
believe that sanctions will work, arguing that the gradual ratcheting up of
sanctions only helps the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)
solidify its control over Iran's black-market economy. Thus, at the end of
the day, the current sanctions policy will do little to limit Iran's nuclear
program and will make the likelihood of military action more plausible.
Drawing on its experience during the Gulf War, Turkey is adamantly
opposed to any military action because the resulting chaos, they believe,
will undermine Turkish economic growth and will exacerbate problems
faced by its Kurdish minority.
Even though the United States and Turkey share many of the same goals
in the region, they have set about implementing policy differently. Turkey's Iran policy will help determine how the international community
deals with the perceived problems posed by Iran's progressing nuclear
program. Turkey's longstanding alliance with the West and its renewed
commitment to strengthen relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors
will continue to impact the global response to Iran's nuclear program and
shape the ongoing debate about the most appropriate response to Iran's
refusal to comply with the United Nations Security Council. Turkey's Iran
policy will also continue to impact its relations with the United States, the
world's lone superpower and the guarantor of Turkish security. Furthermore, Turkey's recent desire to position itself as a mediator in the Middle
East may offer the West another diplomatic tool to help facilitate dialogue
between itself and Iran. However, in order for both sides to fully take
advantage of Turkey's diplomatic enthusiasm, they must first understand
the underpinning of each other's Iran policy. Thus, each side can identify
the areas where their policies converge, which in turn will help the West
and Turkey better coordinate their diplomatic efforts in the future.
To do so, the United States should make an effort to better understand
Iran's and Turkey's long history of relations. By doing so, the United
States will better understand the historical elements that continue to
shape the two countries' relationship. This will allow the United States to
5
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better understand Turkish intentions in Iran. The history of the two countries' relations reveals a complex nexus of competing religious ideology
and mistrust, but also the absence of armed conflict since the current border was delineated nearly five centuries ago. In order for the United States
and Turkey to move forward and coordinate their Middle East policies, it
is necessary for the West to understand the history of Turkish-Iranian
relations.

Historical Background: Iranian-Turkish Relations
The foundation of Turkish-Iranian relations is a shared sense of national
identity that stems from a common history of powerful empires that were
usurped by imperialism. Both countries are home to historic Middle Eastern empires that controlled large swaths of territory in the Middle East
and Central Asia. The two former empires shared a number of cultural
and religious similarities. Iran's Safavid Empire was a source of great
inspiration for the Anatolian Turkmens who were dissatisfied with the
bureaucratic centralism of the Ottoman Empire during the fifteenth century.9 During the Ottoman-Safavid war of 1514, the Ottoman Empire conquered Eastern and Western Anatolia and present day Azerbijan.
Subsequently, the Ottomans successfully conquered the territory of modern-day Iraq from the Safavids in 1534. The two Empires relentlessly
fought over the two territories encompassing Baghdad and Mosul before
eventually signing the Kasr-ı Şırın Treaty in 1639, which delineated Iran's
and Turkey's current border and granted control of the Iraqi territories to
the Ottomans.10
Modern-day leaders in Iran and Turkey often point to the 1639 Peace
Treaty as a symbol for the two country's long history of amicable and
peaceful relations. Despite the lofty diplomatic rhetoric, tensions surrounding Safavid Shi'ism and "the Ottoman version of Islamic Orthodoxy" continued to influence and undermine relations between the two
countries for hundreds of years after the signing of the Kasr-ı Şırın
Treaty. The simmering tensions were finally resolved in 1847 after Qajar
Persia and Ottoman Turkey signed the Treaty of Erzurum.11 Relations
remained stable up until the turn of the century and turned for the worse
at the onset of the First World War.
Following the First World War, Turkey's Mustafa Kemal [Ataturk] and
Iran's Reza Khan implemented a number of top-down secular nationalist
reforms. The imposition of these reforms led to domestic turmoil and separatist activity. The chaos that ensued continues to influence Iran's and
Turkey's social and national security policies and underpins the two coun6
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tries' relationship to this day. Both leaders adopted platforms emphasizing independence, universal secular education, equality, and the
centralization of Turkish and Farsi, respectively, as the official language
of the state.12 In both cases the country leaders tapped into the population's nascent nationalism to muster political legitimacy to gain power for
their nationalist movements. The advocacy of a staunch secular nationalist ideology, combined with the two countries' heterogeneous demographic, led to civil strife and unrest among large segments of the
population.13 To quell the violence, leaders in both countries set about
creating a new sense of national identity. In Turkey, Ataturk propagated
the notion of a uni-ethnic Turkish society, while in Iran the Shah propagated Persian nationalism. In both cases, religion was seen as the source
of the country's fragility and the root cause of society's social problems.14
Early Iranian and Turkish policies also reflect the geo-strategic reality of
the post-World War I world. Both Turkey and Iran are non-Arab-majority
Muslim states that are located in geographically unstable areas. As such
their early security policies were geographically centered, and focused on
maintaining friendly relations with neighboring states and on respecting
state sovereignty. Thus, during this time period, Iran and Turkey did not
adopt a foreign policy based on the subversion of national sovereignty, as
did other states in the Middle East.15 Instead, the two states worked to
quell domestic unrest and consolidate the power of the new nationalist
governments.
At the outset of the Cold War, Turkey and Iran adopted a pro-Western
foreign policy. Driven by a nascent fear of Soviet expansion, Turkey and
Iran actively sought an alliance with the Western powers to help bolster
their defenses in the event of a Soviet attack. This is evidenced by the two
countries' participation in the short-lived, and ultimately unsuccessful,
Baghdad Pact (and the follow-on organization CENTO) and the informal
"alliance of the periphery" with Israel.16 During the early days of the Cold
War, Iran's and Turkey's strategic locations were of great importance to
the new security paradigm taking shape in the Middle East. Both countries came to be front-line Cold War states and were expected to resist any
military encroachments by the Soviet Union. The United States, in an
effort to exert its influence and control in the Middle East, provided both
countries with billions of dollars worth of advanced military equipment
and training.
The geo-strategic significance of the Bosporus Straits, deft Turkish diplomacy, and Turkey's proximity to the Soviet Union's oil fields in presentday Azerbijan ultimately led the United States to invite Turkey to join the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952.17 Turkey's inclusion
7
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in the Alliance increased its access to American-supplied military equipment and led to the establishment of the region's most powerful military.
According to John Calebrese in his article Turkey and Iran: Limits of a
Stable Relationship, "Turkey's privileged status in the Western alliance
aroused the Shah's envy, but did not damage Turco-Iranian relations."18
"Instead, both countries were more concerned about the rise of rival powers in the region—Greece in the case of Turkey, and the spread of Arab
nationalism in Iraq and Egypt in the case of Iran."19 The two countries'
views on security reflected their attitudes and beliefs about their regional
security situation, and the two countries' similar ideology and outlook
decreased tensions and fostered cooperation. As such, the two countries
did not feel threatened by one another and sought out ways to deepen
relations.20
Close relations continued during the 1960s, and the two countries deepened security and diplomatic relations in the wake of the new policy of
détente in the United States and Soviet Union. Spurred on by a large
influx of petro-dollars during the oil crises in the 1970s, the Shah of Iran
embarked upon a massive military modernization program. The Shah was
seeking to replace the British as the guarantor of security for the small
Gulf oil kingdoms. Gains made by the Soviet Union in the region, namely
the conclusion of Friendship Treaties with India and Iraq, added to the
Shah's sense of insecurity and hastened his resolve to build up the country's armed forces. Iran was seeking to control the Strait of Hormuz and
the vital shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean. The Shah's ambitious military program certainly piqued the interest of the Turkish armed forces,
but the Shah's preoccupation with the Gulf States and the Persian/Arabian Gulf did not immediately threaten Turkish interests in the region.
Thus, Iran and Turkey maintained their close relations, despite the Shah's
massive military modernization program.

The Islamic Revolution
Up until the Islamic Revolution, Turkey and Iran regarded each other as
status quo powers in the Middle East that shared a common world outlook and faced similar security threats. However, the Islamic Revolution
changed the complexion of Iran's governing ideology and altered Iran's
security policies. Ayatollah Khomeini's fiery rhetoric and desire to overthrow the Gulf Oil sheikdoms ran counter to Turkey's non-interventionist
foreign policy. Overnight, the new Islamic Republic adopted policies that
were antithetical to Turkish interests in the Middle East, such as promoting the eradication of the state of Israel and supporting proxy groups to
export Iran's unique interpretation of Shi'ite Islam.
8
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In the aftermath of the Revolution, a number of Iranians fled to Turkey,
raising suspicions that these groups of immigrants were sympathetic to
the Islamic Revolution and could foment religious unrest in Turkey. During the 1980s, Turkey was experiencing a period of extreme domestic
unrest. The domestic turmoil prompted the military to intervene and take
over Turkey's elected government in 1980. This military takeover was
compounded by the outbreak of violence in Eastern Turkey by members
of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Khomeini's emphasis on exporting the Revolution naturally raised suspicions in secular Turkey. Ankara
was wary of Khomeini's rhetoric and believed that Iran was allied with
insurgent groups that would eventually target Turkey's secular Republic.21 Tensions were exacerbated after Ankara alleged Tehran's clandestine support for the PKK.22 These accusations are notable because these
two issues have dominated Turkey's national security policies since the
founding of the Republic. Despite Ankara's allegations, Turkey maintained its "hands-off" policy in the Middle East and adopted a policy of
neutrality during the Iran-Iraq war.23
Turkey maintained its policy of strict neutrality throughout the Iran-Iraq
war. As a result, it was able to benefit economically because it was one of
the few countries that did not join the global effort to economically isolate
Iran. During the war, Iran emerged as Turkey's second largest supplier of
natural gas, after Iraq. During the 1990s, trade between the two countries
gradually increased. By 2000, it totaled nearly $1 billion. By 2005, it had
increased to nearly $5 billion; and by 2008, it topped $10 billion annually.24 In 2010, trade dropped to $5.5 billion because of the global recession and the drop in oil and natural gas prices.25
The warming of relations was punctuated in August 2010, when the Turkish Daily Milliyet reported that Turkey was expected to remove Iran from
a watch list of countries that it considered to be a "specific threat."26 The
updated security outlook was drafted by the country's powerful and influential National Security Council and was adopted in October 2010. The
new review mentioned Iran's nuclear program, but did so as a part of Turkey's oft-repeated desire for a region free of nuclear weapons. The statement was interpreted as a reference to Israel, which is believed to be the
region's only nuclear-weapons state.27 The timing of the report coincided
with a number of high-level talks between American and Turkish officials
over Turkish-Iranian trade relations. Officials from the United States
treasury had reportedly grown impatient with Ankara's robust trade with
Turkey, despite U.S. and European Union sanctions meant to limit investment in Iran's oil and gas sector and their efforts to bar the export of
refined petroleum to Iran.
9
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This expected move came only two months after Turkey, along with Brazil, refused to support a fourth round of UN Security Council Sanctions
against Iran for its refusal to freeze enrichment and answer a number of
questions about suspected weaponization research. While Turkey is not a
veto-holding member of the UNSC, meaning that its "no" vote could not
derail the sanctions package, the United States and the European powers
were seeking to pass the sanctions unanimously. The unanimous passage,
they argued, increased Iran's isolation and was an important show of
international consensus against Iran's enrichment program. Turkey's
"no" vote set off a chorus of anti-Turkey rhetoric in the United States. The
dominant story line, among Republican politicians and right-wing media
pundits, was that Turkey was shunning its traditional Western allies
because it was embracing an "Islamist ideology."
These recent events have given rise to a difficult time in U.S.-Turkish relations. During the Cold War, the alliance was cemented by Cold War politics, fears over the Soviet Union, and a general loathing of Communism.
However, after the fall of Communism, the two allies have struggled to redefine their relationship. The difficulties were punctuated during the runup to the second Gulf War. Despite massive political pressure and a $15
billion dollar aid package, Turkey's Parliament failed to pass a bill that
would have allowed American troops to invade Northern Iraq from Turkish territory. Washington was stunned by the vote, and Former Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld went as far as to blame Turkey for the postwar insurgency.
Tensions eased after the United States began supplying intelligence to
Turkey that allowed its air force to bomb targets in Northern Iraq. The
United States' commitment to repairing relations was underscored in
April 2009 when newly-elected President Obama traveled to Turkey to
reaffirm the Turkish-U.S. alliance and implore closer cooperation.28
However, the euphoria surrounding Obama's visit was short-lived, and
tension continued over Iran. These tensions have continued, and neither
government appears to have a solution. The United States remains committed to its policy of coercion, while Turkey does not seem to be prepared to "toe the policy line" espoused by the Western powers. As a result,
tension over how to deal with Iran now dominates the relationship. This
issue has clouded the fact that both countries have a mutual interest in
maintaining friendly ties.
If the United States and Turkey were to better understand each other's
intentions in the Middle East, both could work together to maximize their
political self-interest. However, before this can happen, both countries
have to reassess their immediate policy interests in the region. This
10
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includes working together to solve the Iranian nuclear crisis, along with
many of the other festering conflicts throughout the Middle East. If the
United States can capitalize on Turkey's new diplomatic enthusiasm, it
will benefit U.S. interests in the region. This will entail the United States
recognizing and acknowledging Turkish interests and working to ensure
that Turkey's immediate interests are enhanced by cooperating with the
United States. This will not be an easy task and will entail both countries
working more closely together.

Charting a New Path Forward: Redefining the U.S.Turkish Partnership
The first steps towards reconciliation should include a clear enumeration
of each country's foreign policy objectives. The tenets of each other's foreign policy are well known and widely available, should one choose to
look; however the United States and Turkey should restate their immediate and long-terms goals, the first of which should be the reconciliation of
policy about Iran. This should take the form of an official communiqué
from both governments and be reaffirmed through a series of official
meetings designed to clarify questions about intent.
As of now, both countries share a common interest in ensuring that Iran
does not acquire nuclear weapons. Turkey's President Abdullah Gul,
despite supporting Iran's right to civilian nuclear technology, has indicated his support for a Middle East nuclear weapons-free zone in numerous interviews and during his speech to the United Nations.29
Unfortunately, his recent calls come at a time when Turkey's relations
with Israel have deteriorated. This has led to the widespread belief that
Turkey is making a concerted effort to equate Iran's nuclear program with
Israel's. In the United States, policymakers are growing increasingly frustrated with this stance because they do not want to equate Iran's nuclear
program with Israel's. Instead, they wish to decouple the two issues and
rally a coalition to continue its policy of "containment." This is reflective
of the United States' long-held strategic objectives in the region. Turkey's
recent foray into Israeli-Palestinian issues has upset Washington and,
more importantly, goes against one of the major pillars in American foreign policy, namely the maintenance of Israel's military superiority vis-àvis its Arab neighbors.
The diplomatic rhetoric has resulted in the Iranian and Israeli issues
being connected. Thus, both sides expect some sort of concession on one
issue before being prepared to make concessions on the other. This titfor-tat thinking is counterproductive and limits the effectiveness of U.S.11
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Turkish policy in the Middle East. In the interests of maximizing their
policy interests, the United States and Turkey should make an effort to
decouple Israel from their immediate policy issues in the Middle East.
First, the United States should reiterate its support for the full implementation of the 1995 NPT Review Conference Resolution that "calls upon all
States in the Middle East to take practical steps towards the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass
destruction."30 The United States did as much when it supported a UN
Security Council Resolution reaffirming support for the 1995 Resolution
in May 2010.31 This statement echoes those of Gul and should serve as the
basis for a complementary nonproliferation policy in the Middle East.
These goals should be expanded upon and reiterated in a series of track
one and track two diplomatic meetings that focus on the future of the
Middle East, and on how the U.S. and Turkey can cooperate to achieve
their objectives.
Secondly, the United States should take advantage of the recent fuel-swap
arrangement that Turkey and Brazil negotiated with Iran in order to help
resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis. The tepid response to Brazil's and
Turkey's agreement with Iran cannot be taken back, but the United States
could use Turkey's diplomatic credibility to further talks with Iran. For
example, Iran has recently stated its willingness to return to talks over its
nuclear program.32 Thus far the United States has reaffirmed their
commitment to renewed negotiations with Iran, did not mention
imposing specific sanctions should these upcoming talks fail, and have
indicated that a revised and updated agreement to deliver uranium fuel
rods could be part of a confidence-building measure before many of the
core issues are addressed.33 As a first step, the United States and its
Western allies could honor Iran's willingness to ship 1,200 kg of lowenriched uranium (LEU) to Turkey, in exchange for fuel rods for the
Tehran Research Reactor.34
Critics of the deal are correct when they claim that the deal has little nonproliferation value because it does little to slow Iran's controversial
nuclear program. Experts estimate that a country like Iran would need
1,200 kg of LEU to produce enough fissile material for one nuclear
weapon, should Iran decide to enrich its LEU to 90 percent. When the
Declaration was concluded, the IAEA had reported that Iran had accumulated 2,300 kg of LEU. The removal of 1,200 kg of LEU would allow Iran
to replenish its LEU stockpile quickly, thus negating the nonproliferation
benefits of the fuel-swap arrangement.35
The deal's intended purpose, when the permanent members of the UN
Security Council plus Germany (P5+1) first proposed it in October 2009,
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was a confidence-building mechanism meant to temporarily remove the
possibility that Iran could further enrich its stockpiled LEU for a nuclear
weapon. The United States and other members of the P5+1, including
Russia, were quick to point out the Declaration's deficiencies. However,
these probing criticisms disregarded Turkey's official policy on the subject. Ahmet Davutoglu, in an official statement released on the Turkish
Foreign Ministry's website, pointed out that "critics of the Tehran declaration refer to the fact that it does not treat all problems surrounding Iran's
nuclear program. This was never the purpose of the original agreement.
But we [Turkey] believe that the declaration helps to address the entire
issue by providing essential confidence-building, the key missing component thus far."36
Turkey argues that the P5+1 had been pursuing this deal, but had been
unable to convince Iran to agree. Despite the likelihood that Iran was trying to derail the forthcoming UN sanctions, the fact remains that Turkey
was able to convince Iran to ship out 1,200 kg of LEU in one shipment to a
neutral third party. Up until this point, the P5+1 were unable to convince
Iran to ship out its LEU to a neutral third site in one batch. Turkey argues
that this agreement should be thought of as a first step towards achieving
an overall diplomatic settlement. Davutoglu's website article, entitled
"Giving Diplomacy a Chance," reflects the theoretical underpinning of the
AK Party's foreign policy. In the interim, the United States should take
advantage of Turkey's willingness and ability to engage Iran on sensitive
issues. The P5+1 should invite Turkey and Brazil to the latest round of
talks about Iran's nuclear program. As a starting point for new negotiations, the P5+1 should use the text of the Iran-Turkey-Brazil Declaration.
The P5+1 should be prepared to accept an initial delivery of 1,200 kg of
LEU, in exchange for a promise that Iran will accede to the IAEA's Additional Protocols and abide by the internationally accepted definition of
Article 3.1 of its nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA.37 If Iran
were to accept these terms, it would be an important first step and help
build confidence. It would also serve the United States and Turkey's overall strategic objectives. Turkey would have helped register a "diplomatic
win" without the use of force, and the United States would have severely
limited Iran's ability to quickly produce a nuclear weapon, and at the
same time preserved Israeli security.
By including Turkey in the negotiations, the P5+1 gain a negotiating partner that has proven itself to be committed to strengthening its relations
with Iran, while still pursuing a negotiated settlement to the nuclear crisis. Turkey's previous success could help break the cycle of negative reciprocity, and may lead to each side's making concessions. In short, any
effort to break the persistence of zero-sum thinking can help move diplo13
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matic processes forward and help contribute to an eventual agreement. If
Turkey were to be included in the talks, the United States and other members of the P5+1 could help shape the trajectory and positions of all of the
negotiating parties. This would help unify the negotiating position of all
parties involved and help create more transparency among all parties
about their ultimate intentions.

Conclusion: Identifying Common Interests
The divergence in opinion over the United States' and Turkey's Middle
East policies stems from an ideological difference over how to implement
foreign policy. The United States has long favored a policy of coercion,
while Turkey has turned its back on this policy and is now convinced that
"soft power" is best suited to achieving its objectives. Despite this, the two
countries share an overwhelming interest in maintaining friendly ties and
working together in the Middle East. In order to maintain these relations,
both countries have to work together to clearly enumerate each other's
immediate interests, identify areas of convergence, and respect areas of
disagreement.
The most practical method moving forward is to decouple the Israeli issue
from broader Middle East issues, quickly followed by working together to
resolve the dispute over Iran's nuclear program. By doing so, the allies
can redefine their alliance to meet the challenges each country faces in the
21st century. In the absence of the Communist threat, the two allies can
chart a new path forward that favors regional diplomacy and the pursuit
of each other's interests. This will necessitate a more open dialogue on
each side that downplays Turkey's religion and the United States' coercive
policy, in favor of each other's complementary interests. The fact of the
matter remains that the two countries share more interests than differences over the threats and opportunities they face.
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